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This thesis presents a wide spectrum of computer data
security, including both practical and theoretical aspects
of the subject. It was motivated by the concern for the
general lack of adequate knowledge, techniques, implemen-
tation, and application of computer data security. The
objective was to (1) review the pertinent features of data
security and the relationship of these features to the
computer and its users; (2) generate an awareness of the
techniques and problems in data security by presenting the
main issues; and (3) discuss theoretical as well as specific
applications of techniques and methodology for data base
security and data access control. The intention was to
present to everyone concerned - from the manager to the
computer expert - the necessity for computer security and








NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 11
A. HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT 11
B. SCOPE OF DATA SECURITY 12
C. COMPUTER ENVIRONMENT 14
1. Multi-Level Data 14
2. Multi -Programming 14
3. Multi-Processing 15
4. Multi-Level User 15
5 . Remote Terminal Access 16
D. DATA SECUIRTY THREATS 17
1. Accidental 17
2 . Deliberate 17
E . COMPUTER ABUSE 19
F . PRIVACY 21
III. DESIGN AND APPLICATION OF DATA SECURITY 24
A. THEORY OF PROTECTION 24
B. PROTECTION MECHANISMS IN MULTI CS 26
C . DATA ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS 27
1 . Memory Level 28
2 . Process Level 23
3. Logical Level 30
D. AUDIT AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES 32
E. CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATION 33

IV. PHYSICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA SECURITY 37




V. A DATA SECURITY MODEL 40
A. THE PHYSICAL MODEL 40
B. THE PROCEDURAL MODEL 44
C. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 47
VI . CONCLUSIONS 53
APPENDIX A 55
LIST OF REFERENCES 57





Access Control Matrix 25
2 Ring Protection Structure 30
3. Privilege Control Matrix 31
4 Security Verification System 43
5. Security Property Determination Matrix 50

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to express his appreciation to
Professor Gerald L. Barksdale, Jr., for his guidance and
assistance with the formulation, organization and content
of this thesis. Special thanks go to my wife Corky, for
her understanding and typing assistance.

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult problems confronting the com-
puter industry today is that of data security. The problem
is one which involves the manufacturer, operator, and user,
and encompasses physical facilities, operational procedures,
computer hardware, software, and programming techniques.
The computer is rapidly emerging from its childhood status
to take its place as an indispensible part of our modern
society. The more dependent we become on the computer's
abilities and the more significant its work becomes, the
more important it is to protect the computer from those who
would misuse its power. The problem of computer data se-
curity is expressed by Peter S. Brown [Ref. 1] :
"The computer has unleashed countless
opportunities for industrial growth, ac-
tivity, new applications, labor-saving
accomplishments, improving the quality of
decisions and many others. At the same
time, computer technology has spawned a
whole new field of crime and generated a
series of problems for both designers and
users of information systems."
Our social, political and technical lives are rooted in
an information-based society with an expanding need for col-
lecting and storing information. Most recently, even our
private lives have been touched by this ability to collect
and propensity for accumulating large data bases. It is
generally agreed that the effective use of information pro-
vides the capability for an organization to improve its

efficiency of operation. However, the advent of computers
did not initiate the desire for information gathering nor
did it create the data security problem. Organizations have
always collected information and then had the problem of its
security. Computers have enlarged the scope of information
gathering, allowing greater and greater quantities of infor-
mation to be collected, recorded and retrieved at high
speed. The problem lies in the fact that computer based
centralized information systems contain large amounts of
easily accessible data, making intrusion and compromise prof-
itable. Any effective data security system must have as its
ultimate goal the methodology for ensuring that the value of
the information is not worth the effort required to obtain
it.
The objective of this thesis was to (1) review the per-
tinent features of data security and the relationship of
these features to the computer and its users; (2) present
the main issues in data security so that an appreciation and
awareness of the techniques and problems involved can be
easily grasped; and (3) discuss theoretical as well as spe-
cific applications of techniques and methodology for data
base security and data access control.
Good [Ref. 26] has said, "Information is a unique asset
in that it can be stolen but may never be missed (in contrast
to a physical asset)." For this reason, protection of in-
formation is an insidious business and will require much of
our intelligence and technology to successfully accomplish.
10

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A prerequisite to solving a problem is a clear under-
standing of the problem itself; computer data security is
no exception. The intent of this section is to present the
computer data security problem with respect to its origin,
development, and present environment. Analysis is presented
relative to the abuse and privacy infringement of computer
data, and the threats against data security.
A. HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT
Historically man's quest for obtaining information and
data has been the basis for innumerable tales of intrigue,
deception, and ingenuity. History can be segmented into
eras delimited by what has been called "data-handling
revolutions" by Kahn and Prywes [Ref . 2 and 3] . The first
data handling revolution began around 1650 with the insti-
tution of regular intercity postal services. Shortly there-
after, government groups often called "black chamber
operations" were organized to illegally collect the infor-
mation. They would intercept the mail, extract useful in-
formation, re-seal the letters, and send them on without
the sender's or receiver's knowledge. The next data han-
dling revolution began with the introduction of the telegraph
about 1850. Again government organized groups, as well as
commercially sponsored teams, were used for the illegal in-
terception, decoding, and distribution of telegraphic
11

messages. The third data handling revolution commenced
around 1895 with the introduction of the radio. Presently
we find ourselves a few years into a major technological
revolution in data handling involving computers. Histori-
cally then, it is not surprising to find individuals and
organizations involved in the work of illegally obtaining,
manipulating, destroying, or in some way compromising com-
puter based data. A projection of historical developments
indicates that we should expect a growing trend of well
financed and organized activities to attempt to gain access
to secure data.
B. SCOPE OF DATA SECURITY
The scope of data security can be as wide and complex
as the data the system is designed to protect. It can range
from a simple lock on the door of the computer room to the
use of sophisticated hardware, software, and crypto- graphic
techniques. Techniques for security also include programmed
routines, manual procedures, and physical means using secu-
rity personnel, locks, keys, badges, voice prints, and hand
prints. The International Business Machine Corporation
[Ref. 4] defines data security as follows:
"Data security can be defined as the
protection of data from accidental or in-
tentional disclosure to unauthorized per-
sons and from unauthorized modification."
This definition was taken from a widely distributed IBM
monograph on data security which was instrumental in focusing
12

attention on the problem. Another definition comes from
Clark Weissman [Ref. 5] who states that:
"Security of computer based data
systems is the prevention of (1) un-
authorized gain of information or sys-
tem access, (2) denial of authorized
access, and (3) data or service falsi-
fication."
The techniques of data security must be applied across
the total automatic data processing (ADP) system in order
to be effective. This total system can be classified into
six specific elements: (1) physical environment, (2) peo-
ple, (3) communications, (4) policies and procedures, (5)
hardware, and (6) software. In its broadest sense, data
security is involved with the storage of removable storage
media, such as magnetic tape reels, magnetic disk packs,
input cards, and output listings. Additionally, programmer
and electronic data processing controls, auditing personnel
selection, and employee security are related to data secu-
rity. Yet another category of data security is the physical
protection measures such as guard services, alarms and locks,
closed circuit television, and bugging devices. Also re-
lated to data security are techniques in data processing as
in data checking, maintaining backup files, alternate pro-
cessing facilities in case of equipment malfunction, and
program testing and software verification. Lastly, part of
computer data security is the legal controls and insurance





Data security is a function of the level of data that is
to be protected. Its security is also dependent upon and
dictated by the environment in which the computer is oper-
ated, and the data transmitted. One of the reasons that
data security has become such a problem to the computer in-





In an environment of multi-level data, the computer
system contains data with various levels of classification,
such as: UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET
A scheme of hardware and/or software must be employed to
handle these different levels of data. The system must
maintain the mutual disjunction between the different levels
and still allow reasonable access by authorized users. A
non-homogeneous data bank significantly increases the num-




The technique of multi -programming produces an
environment which permits more than one job to occupy the
computer at the same time. Since the possibility exists
that each job may be at a different level of classification,
the security system must provide for compartmentalizat i on
with no possibility cf intersection during simultaneous
main memory occupancy. There arc a number of computer data
]4

security systems which provide some measure of partitioned





Multi-processing is a system that includes more
than one central processing unit (CPU) . In a multi-
processing system, each CPU operates independently of one
another primarily to increase system throughput or relia-
bility. The CPU's share information by using the same main
storage and by using the same input/output devices. Where
main storage is shared, usually the same routines are used
and the same queue of jobs serviced. According to Katzan
[Ref. 6], multi-processing represents a serious potential
data security problem, since a program executing in one CPU
can utilize the same locks and keys used in one of the other
CPU's. Specifically, the threat to data security is due to
the common utilization of security controls and memory be-
tween CPU's, and the simultaneous occupancy of memory by
programs using different levels of data. This condition
reflects a degradation in the mutual disjointness of infor-
mation segments required for a secure data system. Conse-
quently, a more complex system of hardware and software is
required to maintain data security in an environment of
multi -processing.
4 Mult i -Level User
At most computer installations, each user is given
some level of security clearance. These classes can be as
15

many and as varied as desired, however, most organizations
follow closely the military's system of UNCLASSIFIED, CON-
FIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The military goes a step
further and bases individual access on a two parameter func-
tion, the first being the level of clearance, and secondly
a "need to know" associated with the specific data. The re-
sult is a unique set of users for each specific piece of
data. In computer data security, a further restriction to
the data access authority of the user is the type of access
allowed, such as read only, write, append, grant further
access, execute, delete, etc. A discussion of the theoret-
ical and actual implementation of data security for a multi-
level user via an access control matrix format will be
discussed in sections III and IV.
5 . Remote Terminal Access
A large share of the problems in data security in-
volves time and resource sharing remote terminal systems.
Since many users have access to the system, identification
and authorization security systems are needed. A system
which allows users to share the direct-access storage fa-
cilities dynamically must provide a data security system
that prevents one user from accessing another user's data.
Since data must be sent between terminal and computer, some
form of secure communication must be an integral part of any
data security system. User identification and authorization,
data storage, data integrity, and secure data transmission
will be discussed in detail later.
16

D. DATA SECURITY THREATS
The underlying principle of data security is to prevent
data from being compromised. The reason for the wide range
of security techniques employed today is that data compro-
mise can occur in various forms and under numerous condi-
tions. Petersen and Turn [Ref. 7] classify the threats to
data security as being accidental or deliberate.
1 . Accidental Threats
The major portion of any computer data threat dis-
cussion usually involves deliberate infiltration; however,
the consequences from accidental disclosure of sensitive
information could be just as costly and serious as an in-
cident in which deliberate means were used to gain data
access. Accidental disclosures of data could be as a result
of hardware failures, software errors from poorly designed
or only partially debugged programs, or operational errors
such as mounting the wrong magnetic tape or magnetic disk
pack. Accidental threats are insidious in nature but can
be considered logically as a proper subject of deliberate
threats. Therefore, the remainder of this section will be




Deliberate infiltration implies a plan or purpose
with preconceived objectives in mind. Carrol and McLelland
[Ref. 8] list their objectives of deliberate infiltration
as: (1) gaining access to information in files; (2) dis-
covering the information interests of users; (3) altering
17

or destroying files; and (4) obtaining free use of system
resources. Petersen and Turn [Ref. 7] further classify
deliberate efforts to gain information as passive or active.
Some deliberate passive threats are caused by elec-
tro-magnetic radiation from computer hardware and communica-
tions equipment by observation of data traffic at some point
in the system. Passive methods include electromagnetic
pickup, wiretapping, and information obtained from concealed
transmitters. One of the least guarded against and most
productive deliberate passive techniques is to examine
periodically the contents of the waste containers in and
around the computer or remote terminal area. It is not un-
common for copies of partially working programs and lists
of input and output data to find their way into the most
convenient waste receptacle.
Most of the data security techniques and counter-
measures are directed against deliberate active threats
asserts Katzan [Ref. 6] . These threats are similar for
all computer data systems and differ primarily in the degree
to which a specific system design feature allow exploita-
tion. Deliberate active threats includes the following:
a. Browsing involves the use of legitimate access




This is the practice of obtaining proper iden-
tification through improper means, such as wiretapping, and
then accessing the system as a legitimate user.
18

c. ' Detection and Use of Trap Doors
The trap doors are hardware features, software
limitations, or specially planted entry points that provide
an unauthorized source with access to the system.
d. Entry via an Active Communications Channel
Penetrating communications channels involves
intercepting messages between a user and the computer
("piggy back") , entry via the communication lines of an
inactive user ("between-lines entry"), and canceling a
user's signoff signal and then continuing to operate under
his password and authorization.
e. Physical Means of Entry
This method includes access to the system
through a position with the computer center, a communications
company, or a vendor, the generation and analysis of "core
dumps", and the theft of removable storage media.
E. COMPUTER ABUSE
Parker, Nycum, and Oura of the Stanford Research Insti-
tute [Ref. 9] have compiled and conducted an extensive
study on computer related crime. They define computer abuse
as any act associated with computers where victims have suf-
fered or could have suffered a loss and perpetrators made
or could have made a gain. There are numerous cases in the
courts today concerned with breaches of computer integrity.
An expert from Anderson and Company, the CPA firm, estimated
recently annual losses from computer thefts in the neighbor-
hood of a billion dollars, [Ref. 3],
19

Fraud, theft, larceny, embezzlement, vandalism, extor-
tion, the crimes are the same, only their environment is
changing. The computer and its automatic data processing
functions are becoming the setting for today's large scale
frauds. Perpetrators of these frauds and thefts need the
skills, knowledge, and access associated with computers and
data communications technology.
Many of the computer frauds read like science fiction
and are presented here only as an indicator of what is hap-
pening today and the potential of what may occur in the
future. An analysis of computer related crimes is given by
Parker and Nycum [Ref . 10] . The first programmer convicted
for stealing programs was in 1964 for which he received a
five year prison term. The first federal criminal case oc-
curred in 1966 when a 21 year old programmer put a patch in
his program to ignore his own checking account in checking
for overdrafts. The first documented case of stealing a
program from the memory of a computer over telephone cir-
cuits and a remote terminal occurred in 1971. Some recent
cases of computer fraud include the $1.5 million New York
Union Dime Bank embezzlement, the $2 billion Equity Funding
Insurance fraud, the $1 million Los Angeles Telephone Com-
pany equipment theft and the $300,000 Long Island and Pitts-
burg Westinghouse embezzlement.
The emergence of the "Robin Mood syndrome" (taking from
from the machines which control society) and the "skyjack
syndrome" (where crime becomes popular) with respect to
20

computers has generated an apathetic public attitude toward
computer data security. Parker believes that in order to
control and prevent computer related crime, ethical standards
and applicable laws must be established, and that technolog-
ical solutions are necessary, but not sufficient.
F. PRIVACY
The concept of "womb to tomb history" for each individual
made possible by the computer's vast storage capacity and
rapid retrieval capability is frightening to many people.
The Federal Government has at least twenty-seven agencies and
bureaus gathering information, much of which is quite private
and personal [Ref . 11] . Some of these agencies and bureaus
are the Census Bureau, the Customs Bureau, the Naturalization
Service, the Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI)
,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , and Depart-
ment of Commerce. Employers gather personal information on
prospective employees, as well as banks, credit card com-
panies, doctors, lawyers, and educational institutions. The
idea of a centralized, cross-referenced, easily and quickly
available master file on each individual is technically pos-
sible. A total "identifier" on a master file, indexed
through a single identifying number (S.I.N.) is both a temp-
tation and a threat. The advantage of S.I.N, in time saved,
cost reductions, and overall accuracy to organizations such
as the police, banks, life insurance companies, Internal
Revenue Service, employers, doctors, and educators is obvious
21

and real. In terms of individual and institutional liberties,
S.I.N, poses a potential of serious consequences including
direct infringement on basic liberties. Large centralized
computer data banks using a single identification number as
the total identifier for an individual do not yet exist;
however, the idea is technically feasible and economically
sound. The development of centralized record keeping seems
almost inevitable.
• Much of the potential for protection and security of
data banks is contained in the basic structure of the com-
puter itself. Its speed, accuracy, and storage capacity
make the computer its own best protector. Until recently,
computer access data security had been geared toward the
protection of industrial and political information. Com-
puter data banks containing sensitive information on an
individual basis must protect the human right to privacy.
The "right to know" or "freedom of information" must be
measured against an individual's "right to privacy." The
United States Constitution in its Bill of Rights guards
against specific invasion of privacy in the matters of
religion, speech, unreasonable search and seizure, and self-
incrimination; no mention is made as to what extent individ-
ual privacy may be abridged for the good of the public. The
new technology is computerized data banks has opened up new
areas of challenge to the basic problem of privacy.
Hurley [Rcf. 11] reports that the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) has summed up a proposal for
22

safeguarding personal information by including in its draft
report on the subject that, "The application of automated
data processing technology to the records containing person-
nel data can be subjected to appropriate and effective social
constraint without diminishing its usefulness." In the final
analysis, the legislative, judicial, and executive branches
of government, in conjunction with private enterprise, must
work together in formulating the attitudes, climate, and
background necessary to solving the problem of computer in-
vasion of privacy. Self -regulation and self-restraint can-
not in itself provide for the guarantee of individual privacy
throughout the ADP environment. A legal framework relating
directly to computers and data banks seems to be the inevi-
table answer. A summary of the main elements of present and
proposed data privacy laws is contained in Martin [Ref. 12,
pages 437 to 446] . The laws and safeguards of a computerized
society may require that other computer provide the checks
and balances necessary to ensure the environment of informa-
tional privacy we require and desire.
2 3

III. DESIGN OF THE COMPUTER DATA SECURITY SYSTEM
The purpose of this section is to review some concepts
of data security and discuss principles, methods, and tech-
niques of data security that are independent of any particu-
lar system. An actual study of a proposed system is discussed
in section V entitled, "A Data Security Model."
A. THEORY OF DATA PROTECTION
A theory of protection is discussed by B. W. Lampson
[Ref. 13] and establishes a method for controlling access
to the objects of a process in an operating system environ-
ment. A second paper by Graham and Denning [Ref. 14], is
based on Lampson's work and presents a formal model of the
concepts and principles of protection theory. Both of these
papers are concerned with operating system structure and
hardware architecture, while the security verification sys-
tem (SVS) proposed in section V suggests security isolated
from the computer's operating system.
Lampson describes the computer's capabilities and re-
sources as a set of "objects" protected by the system's
hardware and software. An operational environment is created
for each user which appears as a virtual machine. The ob-
jective is a protected executing program which is conditioned
such that it: (1) docs not destroy the operating system
files or memory space; (2) will not invade other program's
24

domain; (3) can be shared among other system users; and (4)
may invole another program and share its data files.
Graham and Denning [Ref . 14] , approach data security
from seven different levels of protection of the operating
system. These levels range from complete isolation of pro-
grams or data files to providing "certified" subsystems
whose correctness has been completely validated and guaran-
teed. The objective of Graham and Denning's work is to
present a structure of protection mechanisms that are ef-
fectively independent of the computer system and of internal
program structure. The design of their system involves the
specification of objects, subjects, and protection rules so
that every attempt by a subject to access an object must be
validated by the protection system. As displayed in Figure
1, we define matrix A, with subjects as rows and objects as
columns. Matrix A contains attributes that describe the
access privilege of subject S. to object 0., such that S.
would have A- access to 0.. A- is some attribute (read























- - - A. . -
•
s - - - • • • -
m
Figure 1. Access Control Matrix
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The particular operational environment determines the
manner in which the above concepts of protection theory are
implemented and the degree of protection provided. Normally
the hardware/software protection system is transparent to
the user and is governed by the rules of the actual imple-
mentation. It should be noted that though the protection
systems briefly presented here are theoretical in nature,
they form the basis for many of the methods of data access
security presently being designed or in use.
B. PROTECTION MECHANISMS IN MULTICS
Whenever computer data security is discussed, particu-
larly in the area of secure data sharing, the MULTICS system
is usually mentioned; MULTICS is an acronym for Multiplexed
Information and Computings Service. MULTICS is a prototype
computer utility developed as a result of an ADVANCED RE-
SEARCH PROTECTS AGENCY sponsored research program. The goal
of the MULTICS project [Ref. 15] has been to produce a gen-
eral purpose programming system that provides a large and
diverse user community with: (1) remote terminal access as
the normal mode of system usage; (2) continuous service; and
(3) large amounts of on-line data storage with controlled
secure sharing of information among users.
Unlike nearly all commercially available systems, the
controlled information sharing of MULTICS was an initial
design goa] and the mechanisms to achieve this goal were
built-in from the very beginning. The protection mechanism
26

is essentially a hardware addressing mechanism and a hard-
ware implemented mechanism for dividing a computation into
multiple regions of different accessibility. Specifically,
the MULTICS hardward implements an access control ring struc-
ture (see process level, page 26), in the following two ways
First, the hardware controls the access checking logic, and
via the segment addressing hardware, validates each virtual
memory reference. Secondly, the hardware contains instruc-
tions for changing the ring of execution. The results of
this hardware based system have been a method which protects
files from unauthorized use while providing secure data
sharing.
Systems which have attempted to provide data security
as an after thought (after hardware design) via software
implementation have had only limited success in comparison
to the hardware oriented system of MULTICS. This implies
that a successful data security system should be an initial
design goal of the hardware, which is substantiated by
Weissman in [Ref . 16] . Corbato [Ref . 17] provides an over-
view of the MULTICS system, including its protection fea-
tures and presents a bibliography of available documents on
the system. A detailed description of the protection hard-
ware in the new MULTICS processor is given by Schroeder and
Saltzer in [Ref. 18]
.
C. DATA ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS
The purpose of data access control mechanisms in a
computer system is to protect private data from compromise
27

while providing the mechanism to allow regulated access to
shareable information. David Hsiao [Ref. 19] views data
access control mechanisms from three levels; (1) memory




The memory level access control mechanisms control
access to memory in terms of units of memory. The protec-
tion of the system is with respect to the segments of memory,
not the segments contents. The contents of each segment of
memory are subject to the same access controls that govern
each memory unit and are protected only as long as they re-
main within the same memory unit. A typical physical memory
protection scheme employs memory bound registers or storage
protection keys which control access to bounded memory areas.
»
2 Process Leve l
A process is simply a set of programs with its as-
sociated data. Therefore, process protection and control
is concerned with access to and protection of programs. An
elaborate process access control mechanism known as the
"ring mechanism" was proposed by Graham [Ref. 20] and is
depicted in Figure 2. This concentric ring mechanism allows
one program to give control to another without violating any
of the access control rights of either program. Conceptually
the concentric ring mechanism requires the user to arrange
his processes hierarchically, where processes at the lower





Each process has a fixed number of domains (protec-
tion rings) . The rings are distinguished by integers
through n-1 (for MULTICS, n = 7) . The ith ring contains the
access capabilities of rings i + 1, i + 2, ..., n-1, and
forms a proper subset of rings i - 1, i - 2, ..., 0. The
sets of access capabilities represented by the various rings
form a collection of nested subsets with ring the largest
and ring n-1 the smallest set in the collection. The result
of this hierarchical system of rings is that protection
provided by a given ring of a process is effective against
procedures executing in higher numbered rings. Having mul-
tiple domains of protection generates the need to change the
domain of execution of a process. Changing the domain of
execution may also change the capabilities available to a
process and, therefore, must be controlled. The control
over the domain change is keyed to certain program loca-
tions called gates, shown in Figure 2. Changing the domain
of execution must occur only as a result of a transfer of
control to one of the gate locations of another domain. If
the transfer is not directed to one of the gate locations,
the transfer is not allowed. The use of separate access
control gate location lists for each data file and separate
descriptor files for each process will provide the means to




Figure 2. Ring Protection Structure.
3. Logical Level
The third, and highest ]evel of access control is
the logical level. A user will generally structure his data
in terms of logical units such as field, records, and files.
Unlike memory levels of access, here the logical units of
information have little resemblance to their physical or
virtual storage images. By allowing the user to associate
access control requirements and protection measures with
logical units, the access control mechanism can facilitate
direct control and protection of the information regardless
of its physical location.
If we let the type of access a user has to the data
base be represented as an authority item, then the entire
collection of authority items can be viewed as an access
control matrix. Allowing the rows of the matrix to represent
users and the columns the logical units of data, as shown in
30

Figure 3, then the entry A. . contains a series of access
privileges and restrictions held by users i to logical unit
i. NOTE: F. = File, r. = Record, £. = Field, A.. = Read
only, Write, Delete, Own, etc.





























Figure 3. Privilege Control Matrix.
For actual implementation, the matrix is too sparse and,
therefore, would be uch to expensive in terms of space to
be stored as depicted in Figure 3. Since access privileges
and restrictions to the same data units differ from one
user to another, and since there are usually more data types
than number of users, the implementation should be user
oriented. Specifically, there should be one set of authority
items per user. The matrix in Figure 3 is essentially the
same as that of Figure 2 on page 30, except that Figure 3
is user (U.) oriented and Figure 2 is process (S-) oriented.
31

In addition, the set {F., r- , f.} of Figure 3 is a subset of
the set {0-} of Figure 2.
D. AUDIT AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES
Auditing and surveillance techniques can provide imme-
diate warnings of illegal system penetration or a posteriori
data security protection. Monitoring can be performed so
that it is known to the infiltrator or transparent to him,
with each attempt to violate the system's security or data
files recorded for subsequent analysis. One approach is to
delay termination of a user after several attempts to access
an unauthorized segment of data, but report the attempted
infiltration to the computer operator or security officer
for appropriate action.
Surveillance and monitoring can be performed at various
levels depending on the classification of data being pro-
tected and security requirements of the system. Some system
violations can always be expected due to user accidents. If
the expected number of violations increases rapidly, it is
reasonable to assume that deliberate penetration attempts
are being conducted. Conversely, if the expected number of
violations decrease markedly, there might be reason to believe
that some means of illegally accessing the system has been
discovered. Data security is a dynamic function which depends
on the kind of data stored and the usage patterns of the users
that access it. The maintenance and use of security logs is
a means of detecting the need for a change in the data secu-




The best computer security system devisable can be ren-
dered totally useless by simple wiretapping techniques dur-
ing classified data transmission. The best-known and most
widely used techniques to provide security for data trans-
mission and to protect sensitive data files are called
privacy transformations. The use of cryptographic systems
can effectively counter the wiretapping threat through en-
coding (enciphering) data prior to transmission and then
decoding (deciphering) after data reception. Data files can
be stored in the enciphered form to provide even greater
protection against compromise.
The basic cryptographic process is a set of rules which
comprise the system which transforms "plain" or "clear" text
into the "cipher" text and then back to the original text
again. Katzan [Ref. 6] defines three main classes of general
cipher systems: (1) transposition systems, (2) substitution
systems, and (3) algebraic systems.
A transposition cipher system is one which the characters
of the plain text data are rearranged in some prescribed
manner. The characters maintain their identity while losing
their positional significance. Transposition ciphers can
usually be easily implemented on a digital computer with
reasonable efficiency; however, they are relatively unso-
phisticated and easily broken.
The substitution cipher system involves the replacement
of plain text characters by other characters. Here the
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plain text characters lose their identity but usually main-
tain positional significance. In its simplest form, a sub-
stitution cipher uses two alphabets, one containing the
characters of the plain text data, the other comprising
the respective cipher equivalents.
An algebraic cipher is a system which replaces the plain
text characters with numbers using some deterministic scheme
and then performs some reversible series of mathematical
operations on these numbers.
Ciphers need not be restrained to single system for
their generation. Use of a digital computer for encoding
and decoding data allows numerous cipher systems to be com-
bined in a complex cryptographic system which is both fast
and virtually error free. Van Tassel [Ref. 21], lists four
criteria that could be applied to the design of a crypto-
graphic system: (1) it should not be necessary to keep the
method secret-only the keys; (2) the amount of secrecy ob-
tained should be directly related to the amount of computing
time necessary to use the system; (3) the system should des-
troy the statistical parameters of the natural structure of
the language; and (4) an error should not destroy successive
information
.
The Vernam cipher system, invented in 1917 by Gilbert
S. Vernam, is particularly applicable to a computer based
data system. This cipher uses a pseudo-random number gener-
ation scheme for its key. The Vernam cipher uses the "ex-
culsive or" operator so that if the plain text were
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10011 and the key were 01001, then the encipherment would
be 11010.
This system is particularly convenient since all digital
computers use the binary digits and 1 to represent its
characters, most digital computers have an "exclusive or"
operator, and encoding and decoding are reciprocal operators.
Originally, Vernam used a tape of random binary digits, how-
ever, it was soon shown that periodic keys were subject to
decryption. The infinite key method presented by Carroll
and McLelland [Ref . 8] , is a technique for use with the
Vernam cipher. This method uses random numbers generated
by a pseudo- random number generator, usually available on
most general purpose computers, with the seed being an N-
digit password. The method "exclusively or's" random keys
with the characters of a plain text data, exactly as in the
Vernam cipher. By manipulation of the seed after N-random
keys are generated (where N is the maximum period of the
generator) , any number of characters can be enciphered.
Now all that remains is the synchronization of the activities
on each end of the data line. This is usually done by es-
tablishing a set of variables (seeds) for the generator and
transporting the information between sites by carrier or
registered mail. Later, all a message need provide is an
indexing number into the particular set of variables to be
used in the generation process. Thus, effective synchroni-




The foregoing section on cryptology has been presented
as a quick overview of a vast subject with only one specific
application to a computer environment. Employment of
cryptographic techniques is an absolute necessity where the
security of transmission lines cannot be guaranteed and the
classification of data warrants the additional time and
cost. For additional references on cryptology relative to




IV. PHYSICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA SECURITY
The theoretical and technical controls discussed in
section III can be effectively negated without the proper
physical and administrative controls. Wasserman [Ref. 22]
suggests that physical security is needed on all aspects of
the data processing operation. The physical protection
required in computer systems is similar to that required
for conventional office spaces. Computer installations raise
a few special problems, such as the control of electromag-
netic devices, wiretapping, electrical supplies, and air
conditioning. Administrative security has the responsibility
for the security techniques and procedures in the day-to-day
computer operation. It is generally agreed that the weakest
link in any computer data security system is the people who
operate the system. The responsibility for personnel secu-
rity clearances, and of employee attitude and conduct with
respect to data security, is a function of administrative
security
.
A. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
Martin [Ref. 12] separates physical security into three
layers of defense. First the perimeter barrier such as a
wall or fence. Second, the walls, windows, doors, and ducts
of the building itself. Third, locked cabinets and vaults.
A perimeter defense, if not guarded by some means, will act
only as a psychological deterrent to some intruders, but have
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little effect on the determined intruder. A perimeter de-
fense that is guarded will offer the protection mentioned
above as well as an early warning of the presence of the
determined intruder. Well-secured doors and windows are
essential to good building security, thus they should have
associated alarm devices. The would-be intruder will likely
enter by some non-alarm controlled passage, such as manholes,
storm drains, utility tunnels, the roof, or through a common
wall. The combination of electronic detectors and a random-
ly roving guard force can greatly enhance building security.
The inner layer Clocked cabinets and vaults) of defense be-
comes important simply because it is the last line of defense
between the determined intruder and the data. The security
of safes, cabinets, and store rooms is often neglected on
the naive assumption that the other two layers will keep out
intruders
.
A large portion of an organization's data security plan
is based on backup tapes for recovery and re-initialization.
These tapes may prove useless if stored in an unsecure
method. Whether the storage area is a safe, vault, or
designated room, it must be resistant to burglars, fire,
water, heat, humidity, and explosion. Reliability is the
prime factor in a security system. The reliance on faulty
security equipment builds in a false sense of security which
can be disasterous. Validation of the reliance of security
equipment must be accomplished through ongoing tests which
measure equipment function against minimum standards criteria.
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B. ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY CONTROLS
Responsibility for the strategy and methodology of
physical security belongs at the highest level o£ management
in an ADP system. A computer system's security officer
should have the responsibility of the following: (1) over-
all security coordination; (2) procedural controls; (3) con-
trols on programs and programmers' physical security; (4)
external administrative controls; and (5) security system
audits. In addition to his responsibilities for physical
security, the security officer may be the only person who
can access the system's authorization tables, determine
access authorities for programs and data, issue passwords,
and ensure correct operation of the data security system.
Finally, the security officer should have the responsibility
for investigation of security violations, review of security
audit records, security training, and assessment of the ef-
fectiveness of the security techniques employed.
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V. A DATA SECURITY MODEL
The following data security model is presented not as a
working mechanism, but as a first step toward a secure com-
puter data system. A system utilizing multi-level data,
multi-programming, multi-processing, multi-level users and
remote terminal access is assumed.
A. THE PHYSICAL MODEL
The literature is full of ideas, schemes, and mathe-
matical models developed for the purpose of user identifica-
tion, data access control, file privacy protection and new
file classification. All these proposed protection plans
seem to pre-suppose that the protection system will be an
integral part of the main computer's operating system.
Making any software protection system part of the operating
system creates immediate deficiencies and problems, such
as: (1) increase of operating system overhead; (2) allowing
near access to the main system prior to any user identifica-
tion; (3) no separation (logic, physical or electrical) be-
tween the protection system and the data it was designed to
protect; and (4) make the security system difficult, if not
impossible to prove formally correct.
Jf the computer's operating system has the total respon-
sibility for system security, then its requirement for CPU
time and memory will increase, allowing less time for prob-
lem directed computation. An operating system with excessive
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overhead will have low efficiency as exhibited by its poor
thruput. Secondly, an unidentified user should not be al-
lowed entrance to the operating system for the purpose of
determining identification and data access control level.
All determination of authorization and access authority
should be made independent of and prior to actual system
connection. Once an illegal user has gained entrance to
the operating system, it is much easier for him to circum-
vent the security controls. Thirdly, as a principle of good
security, there should be a buffer between that which you
are trying to protect and the protection system. Lastly,
the complexity of logic and the large number of instructions
in an operating system make it highly susceptible to unde-
tected penetration, trap doors, modification, and system
errors; in addition, it will be virtually impossible to prove
its correctness. Allowing the data security system to reside
as an integral part of the computer's operating system will
result in an overhead and cost per job increase, efficiency
decrease, and a degradation in the level of overall data
security
.
These considerations suggest the need for a separate,
virtually independent system for user identification and
data access contro] . It is proposed that all or as much of
the security responsibility as possible be delegated to a
separate, independent mini or micro computer system which
will hence be referred to as a "Security Verification Sys-
tem" (SVS) . The SVS has marked advantages, not the least
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of which is low cost. The standard mini or micro-computer
system even with additional storage media, is in the few
thousand dollar range vice hundreds of thousand dollars
range of a large general purpose computer. A SVS inter-
faced with a large general purpose machine, as depicted in
Figure 4, would not increase operating system overhead, but
may actually reduce it. This is true because many of the
file access decisions could be made independent of and
prior to actual access of a specific file by the operating
system. Using a SVS would keep a user separated from the
main data banks until his identification, authority, cate-
gory, and need to know relative to the specific files and
library programs was determined and authenticated. The SVS
would make all the determinations as to user identification
and data access control. The computer's operating system
would merely respond to a "go", "no go" decision and service
the authenticated user within the limits and areas prescribed
by the SVS. Utilizing a SVS as described above would allow
physical, electronic, and logical separation between the
data, CPU, and main memory, and the data security system
designed to protect and control access to them. Using a
small special purpose mini or micro computer security veri-
fication system would make the system correctness more
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B. THE PROCEDURAL MODEL
User identification using the SVS can be made as simple
or as extensive as the data being protected dictates. The
following is merely one possible user identification scheme,
parts of which utilize already existing and implemented
methods, other parts having been proposed by various authors
in the literature and the remaining parts are original.
The initial login procedure would consist of typing in
the user's first name, middle initial, and last name, fol-
lowed by a user's identification number. This identifica-
tion number need not be secret and would only be used for
name/number correlation, administrative bookkeeping and
auditing, and as a final entry point into the specific
user's list of passwords and pertinent personal data. If
the name and user I.D. matched, the SVS would ask the user
to input his first, second, or third password. These pass-
words could be a variable length, alphanumeric string. The
length of the password could be made a function of the level
of data to be protected. For instance, a six character
alphanumeric string would have 36 6 possible combinations.
Two errors during initial login identification would sound
an alarm and disallow the terminal from being connected via
the SVS to the main computer. If the passwords have a uni-
form random distribution, the maximum probability of guess-
ing the correct password on the first attempt would be 1/36 G
or 4.593x10 and would increase slightly to l/36 6 -l for
the second attempt. In order that the response to the
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computer's request for a password would not appear on the
typewritten teletype copy, a prefix such as $PW($PASSWORD)
could be mechanized to prevent the next six input characters
from being printed on the teletype paper.
Hoffman [Ref. 23] recounts Earnest's novel approach to
the scheme of maintaining password integrity which is based
on the assumption that an enemy is attempting to discover a
user's password for his own unauthorized use, by using a
wiretap or other type surveillance. The suggested method
is as follows. The user logs in and identifies himself with
name and user identification number (I.D.). The computer
then supplies a pseudo-random number to the user who per-
forms some simple mental transformation T on the number and
then sends the results of that transformation back to the
computer. The computer (in this case the SVS) performs the
same transformation using a previously stored algorithm.
A comparison is made of the two numbers, with equality rep-
resenting authenticity of the user. The unique feature is
that while the user has performed T on X (pseudo-random No.)
to yield Y = T(x), any unauthorized listener, even if the
information is sent in the clear, sees only the numbers X
and Y. Even a simple transformation like,
T(x) = (-1 dd DIGIT i of X)
2
+ (HOUR OF THE DAY)
- (DAY + X
i )
is almost impossible to break. A numerical example of the
above method after 10:00 o'clock in the morning and before
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11:00 o'clock on the 4th day of the month follows:
The computer asks: PASSWORD (34 871) =
The transformations:
T(X) = (ll) 2 + 1000 - (4 + 11) = 121 + 1000 + 15
= 1136.
The user responds with the number: 1136.
One time identification of a user at a remote terminal
using the form described above may not be sufficient to give
the desired level of protection. A periodic dialogue or ran-
dom repeated interrogation of the user via the SVS may be
necessary as a function of various parameters, such as, job
classification, user and terminal clearance, file classifi-
cation, and time on line. The SVS could ask periodically
for another user password of the alphanumeric or number
transfer form or the SVS could ask various questions of the
user which would normally only be known by him, such as:
(1) wife's maiden name; (2) date and place of marriage; (3)
oldest son's age; (4) mother-in-law's birthday, etc.
The questions could come from a comprehensive question-
naire filled out by the user at some earlier time. This
periodic, ongoing dialogue with the user further ensures
system security and integrity. As before, two incorrect
answers to any question energizes an alarm and drops the
terminal off the line. Another approach to two incorrect
answers would be to continue a dialogue with the suspected
infiltrator while security people arc alerted. This would
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allow the security force to take positive action without the
infiltrators knowledge.
C. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Prior to the modeling of any system, certain assumptions
must be made. The assumptions made above still apply. In
designing security controls, particularly for a military
computer system, an environment of "malicious threat" must
be assumed. According to Weissmann [Ref . 24] , from which
much of the following model was taken, a security control
system should: (1) support heterogeneous levels and types
of classifications; (2) in itself be unclassified until
primed with the security parameters; (3) be isolated from
the total time sharing system; and (4) be relatively inex-
pensive. The SVS attempts to fulfill the above criteria
and assumptions, while providing the security, flexibility,
and growth potential required by most computer installa-
tions. Security is a total system problem encompassing
hardware, software, personnel, communications, and asset
physical security. In the following model, the emphasis is
on the software required to implement the SVS hardware pack-
age, because in most working systems, this is the area of
greatest latitude and freedom in exercising data access
security control. A formal model for a software system of
identification and data access control is developed.
The notion of a security object is defined as any object
which has or can be assigned a level of classification or
clearance, such as a user, terminal, file, job, or any other
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peripheral device desired (i.e., line printer, plotter, com-
puter controlled card punch). For notational purposes, let
u denote some user, t some terminal, j some job, and £ some
file. Various security decisions will be made as a function
of these security objects.
Next we introduce the idea of a security property . Each
of the security objects is described by a security profile
that is an ordered set of four elements of security proper-
ties; Authority (A), Category (C) , Necessity (K) , and Mode
(M) . The security property "Authority" is defined as the
clearance of an object such the UNCLASSIFIED (a ), CONFIDEN-
TIAL (a 1 ), SECRET (a 2 ), and TOP SECRET (a 3 ) are elements
which belong to the set A hierarchically ordered where




The security property "Category" is a set of specific com-
partments which are mutually exclusively sanctuaries with
specific jurisdictions such as: RESTRICTED (c°), CRYPTO
(c 1 ), EYES ONLY (c 2 ), NUCLEAR (c 3 ), POLITICAL (c"), INTELLI-
GENCE (c 5 ) , where the Category C is the set








The security property "Necessity" (or need to know) is the
set of users for each security object such that
K = {u|u is a user}. (3)
The security property "Mode" indicates the type of data access
required. The Mode indicates; READ ONLY DATA (m°), ADD TO
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DATA (m 1 ), CHANGE EXISTING DATA (m 2 ), DELETE FROM DATA (m 3 ),
EXECUTE A PROGRAM (m 1*) or CHANGE A PROGRAM (m 5 ). If we let
a denote a security object, then the set M may contain
none, any combination of or all the elements belonging to M
where
:
M = {m°, m 1 , m 2
,
my . (4)
With respect to the "Necessity" .property (K) , it is possible
to distinguish four sets of users if we allow the user u to
be subscripted by the specific security object. If we let
u?. denote that user number has access to file f and so on
for the other three security objects, except that u° is sim-







= {uj, u^ u^} (6) "








Above, equation (5) is saying that the need-to-know for
a user is restricted to himself. Equation (6) states that
the Necessity of terminal t belongs to <j> different users who
have access to t. Equations (7) and (8) are similarly defined
The matrix of Figure 5 presents the rules for determining
the four security properties for a given object. An example
of the rules follows. For a USER u the A , C and M are


















































Figure 5. Security Property Determination Matrix,
terminal t, A , C and M are assigned constants while K is
given by equation (6). For a job, since we are given A and









Similarly then, since we are given C and C . , C. is deter-3 ' 6 u t ' j
mined as
c. - c n Cjut (10)
and K. is given by equation (7). For a file, A,, C, and M^-
are assigned constants and K
f
is given by equation (8)
.
The object now is for the SVS to control a user's access
to a system, its terminals, and files. Access will be granted
to the system if and only if u belongs to the universal set
of users:
u e U. (11)
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The process for user identification and authentication is
described in the section of this thesis entitled, "THE PRO-
CEDURAL MODEL," page 44.
Access is granted to a terminal if and only if the user
belongs to the Necessity set for the terminal:
u e K . (12)
Now if our SVS concludes that equations (11) and (12)






Finally access is granted to a file if and only if:
1. The authority of the job is greater than the authority
of the file.
Aj > Af (14)
and
2. The Category of the job is a superset of the Cate-
gory of the file
:
C. 3> c.r (15)
j - f
and
3. The Mode of the job is a superset of the Mode of the
file
M. 3 M, (16)
j - f
and
4. The user having jurisdiction over the job belongs to










Computer data security is a complex and many faceted
problem which has only recently received general recognition.
Technology has not now, nor will it ever be able to produce
an absolutely secure computer data system. Technology can
and must produce a system which makes it economically in-
feasible to compromise computer stored information. The
complexity of a data security system depends on the level of
data being protected and environment in which it is being
used. Hardware and software implemented data security sys-
tems must be augmented by physical, administrative, and legal
security techniques in order to ensure the integrity of the
system.
The ultimate goal of a computer data security system is
to adequately protect the data while keeping the system
economically feasible and maintaining reasonable ease of
authorized access. Data security involves people; people
design, implement, and operate the security system to protect
data from being compromised by people. Armed with the know-
ledge of the problem, the theoretical models, and the present
technology, computer data security designers must formulate
the techniques, methodology, and procedures to eliminate
illegal computer data exploitation.
The following quote was taken from the V/WMCCS Senior




"Currently there is no available combin-
ation of software and hardware features that
can insure acceptable security when process-
ing more than one classification/category of
data in an environment other than totally
dedicated. This severely restricts the
capability to share computers that were de-
signed for timesharing in the first place.
To process more than one classification or
category of data with existing hardware and
software requires that all users be cleared
for all data in the system, since there is
no assurance one can access only a specified
portion of a data base. The adverse implica-
tions of this limitation regarding the dis-
tributed data base concept are apparent."
Since large scale ADP systems require years in the pro-
curement cycle, today's security problems are essentially
the result of yesterday's neglect; if there is to be secure
automatic data processing systems tomorrow, it will depend
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